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INTRODUCTION 
Friedrich Savigny, in A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, indicated 
that the application or operation of international law is limited in two 
dimensions: place and time.1  Arbitrator Max Huber, in the award of 
Island of Palmas, introduced the concept of intertemporal law for the 
first time in international dispute settlement.  Huber found, “[A] 
juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary 
with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard 
to it arises or falls to be settled.”2 
Admittedly, the system of international law is all about the subjects, 
events, and disputes occurring within a certain period of time.3  With 
the growth and universalization of international law,4 intertemporal law 
                                                          
1. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: 
AND THE LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME 307–74 
(1869). 
2. Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), II R.I.A.A. 829, 845 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
3. JAMES CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN OPEN SYSTEM: SELECTED 
ESSAYS 69 (2012). 
4. TASLIM O. ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SOME 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1983) (“One of 
the most important results of this universalisation of international law has been the 
doctrine of intertemporal law.”). 
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has gradually developed over the years through case law.5  However, 
the concept has developed fragmentally into several topics, such as 
territorial disputes6 and treaty interpretation.7 Additionally, 
intertemporal law has been studied and viewed as a rule of customary 
international law,8 theory,9 and doctrine.10 
This Article aims to fix the fragments and build a uniform and 
consistent system of international intertemporal law.  For this purpose, 
intertemporal law is defined as the temporal application of law or the 
conflict of law in respect of time.11  The Article is divided into three 
parts.  Part I is a brief literature review of the previous studies on 
intertemporal law and explains the motivation for building a uniform 
and consistent system of international intertemporal law.  Part II will 
carefully analyze intertemporal law as a secondary law rule, its concept, 
its relationship with critical date, its structure, and the formation of the 
intertemporal law system.  Part II will also explore the four categories 
of application of intertemporal law respectively: direct active conflict 
                                                          
5. See, e.g., Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. 
Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. 213 (July 13); Rights of Nationals of United States 
of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 193 (Aug. 27); Island 
of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845; Grisbadarna (Nor. v. Swed.) XI R.I.A.A. 155 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 1909). 
6. See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos (U.K. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 47 
(Nov. 17); Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116 (Dec. 18); Legal 
Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 
53 (Apr. 5). 
7. See, e.g., Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 2009 I.C.J. 
Rep. 213; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 
3 (Dec. 19); Right of Passage over India Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment, 1960 
I.C.J. Rep. 6 (Apr. 12); Rights of Nationals of United States of America in Morocco, 
1952 I.C.J. Rep. 193; Grisbadarna, XI R.I.A.A. 155. 
8. See, e.g., Taslim O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 285 (1980); Louis F. E. Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1251 
(1963). 
9. WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 130–31 (1964). 
10. See, e.g., YEHUDA BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 194 
(1965); ROBERT Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 320 (1963); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 283–85 (1933); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. I, 21–24 (1957-1976). 
11. This definition will be justified in Part II. Also, it will be explained whether 
the two concepts are actually the same. 
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of law, to which territorial disputes set an example; indirect active 
conflict of law—treaty interpretation; procedural negative conflict of 
law—ratione temporis; and substantive negative conflict of law—non-
retroaction.  During the discussion, relevant cases will be analyzed and 
the jurisprudence behind the rule be explored. Thus, the law’s antinomy 
of stability and evolution will be explored.  Finally, Part III will 
summarize the rules established throughout the Article regarding 
intertemporal law. 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW OF INTERTEMPORAL LAW 
Before diving into the pool of international intertemporal law, a 
brief review of intertemporal law at a domestic level is necessary.  
Being deemed as the non-retroactive nature of law (law does not operate 
retroactively ex proprio vigore), intertemporal law stands the test of 
time.  From Timokrates and the Athenian Ambassadors case in Ancient 
Greece, Eastern Roman Emperor Theodosius II’s statements, and the 
Justinian Code, to its broad acceptance in Canon Law and its later 
incorporation in common law through the medium of Bracton and 
Coke.12  We could reasonably presume that today, as Blum concluded, 
“it is a rule generally recognized by civilized nations that in principle 
no retroactive application should be given to any legal norm.”13  
Nevertheless, there are two main debates on intertemporal law at a 
domestic level.  First, the classic common law framework, where judges 
do not create law but merely declare and apply existing law, seems to 
contradict the reason behind non-retroaction, which is the evolution of 
law.14  Second, whether the simple concept of “non-retroaction” is 
capable of clarifying complex situations concerning intertemporal 
law.15  However, even with these debates, intertemporal law at a 
domestic level has become an essential part of the legal construction. 
                                                          
12. See Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic 
Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 776 (1936). 
13. BLUM, supra note 10, at 194. 
14. Id. at 196. 
15. See, e.g., Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertemporal 
Law of Statutory Construction and Constitutional Interpretation, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 
319 (1995); Jackie M. McCreary, Retroactivity of Laws: An Illustration of 
Intertemporal Conflicts Law Issues through the Revised Civil Code Articles on 
Disinherison, 62 LA. L. REV. 1321 (2002); Smead, supra note 12. 
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol48/iss2/6
Li camera ready (2) (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2018  9:46 AM 
2018] INTERNATIONAL INTERTEMPORAL LAW 345 
With respect to international law, the face of intertemporal law 
seems to be covered with chaos.  This chaos may be due to the essential 
controversy over whether international law is positive or natural,16 or 
because of the incomplete and immature situation of the international 
legal system.  It is difficult to determine whether there is sufficient 
research on the topic of international intertemporal law when nearly all 
the leading authorities and most relevant topics––territorial acquisition 
and treaty interpretation––have mentioned the issue.  The word 
“mentioned” is highlighted because international intertemporal law 
tends to be a separate and isolated issue in territorial dispute or treaty 
interpretation conversations.  A uniform and consistent system that 
explores this essential legal concept independently has yet to be created. 
Below are the four main approaches to the study of international 
intertemporal law. 
First, from the perspective of the choice of law in respect of time, 
the topic was early noted by Savigny.  Savigny discussed in detail two 
basic rules: “[n]o retroactive effect is to be attributed to new laws,” and 
“[n]ew laws leave acquired rights unaffected.”17  Since the birth of 
those rules, the concept has always appeared in textbooks and papers 
on private international law.  However, it is brushed lightly upon as the 
“supporting actor,” simply for the integrity of the concept of conflict of 
laws.  Thus far, no innovative discoveries have been made in this field. 
The second approach is by territory law, which likely plays the 
leading role in the family of international intertemporal law.  The 
milestone decision of Island of Palmas brought a blooming period of 
discussion on temporal factors in territorial disputes.  Huber is well-
known for two proposals that address these factors.  First, “a juridical 
fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, 
and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it 
                                                          
16. On this topic, positivist like Hans Kelsen maintain that “no positive norm 
restricting the temporal validity of general international law exists.” HANS KELSEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1952); see also PAUL GUGGENHEIM, TRAITÉ 
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, Vol. I, 111–12 (1953). However, the author 
disagrees with this point and will argue against it in the following part of non-
retroaction. 
17. See SAVIGNY, supra note 1, at 307–74. It is also interesting to note that 
Savigny himself discerned the acquisition of rights and existence of rights, though 
quite different from what Max Huber discussed later in Island of Palmas. 
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arises or falls to be settled.”18  Second, “it cannot be sufficient to 
establish the title by which territorial sovereignty was validly acquired 
at a certain moment; it must also be shown that the territorial 
sovereignty has continued to exist and did exist at the moment which 
for the decision of the dispute must be considered as critical.”19  While 
the first proposal won Huber tremendous applause, the latter led to an 
essential debate in international territorial law.  Judge Philip Jessup and 
Willem Versfelt both incisively criticized the separation of acquisition 
and maintenance of territorial rights, mainly because of the possible 
uncertainty and insecurity it would bring to states’ sovereign rights.  
Their criticism casted doubts on the concept of intertemporal law.20  
Nevertheless, later decisions by international courts and tribunals 
seemed to adhere to both of Huber’s proposals.21 
Shortly after the 1950s, Gerald Fitzmaurice and Shabtai Rosenne 
explored the temporal elements in territorial disputes generally.22  One 
of Huber’s most famous proponents is Louis Goldie, who in 1963 
further clarified the concept as well as the application of critical date, 
and provided plausible explanations regarding the two highly 
controversial rules in Island of Palmas.23  In the same year, leading 
author Robert Jennings argued on the evolution of territorial law and 
offered a justification for treating the acquisition and maintenance of 
title separately in territorial law.24  After the justification was provided, 
later works seemed to merely elaborate on Jennings’ view.25  
                                                          
18. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. 
19. Id. at 839. 
20. See Philip Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 735 
(1928); see also WILLEM JOHAN BERNARD VERSFELT, THE MIANGAS ARBITRATION 
(1933). 
21. See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. 47; Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. 
Rep. 116; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 53. 
22. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE TIME FACTOR IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1960); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-54: Point of Substantive Law, 
Part II, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 20 (1955). 
23. See Goldie, supra note 8, at 1251–84. 
24. See JENNINGS, supra note 10. 
25. See, e.g., BLUM, supra note 10; Elias, supra note 8; GEORG 
SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 
1976); Malcolm N. Shaw, Title, Control and Closure? The Experience of the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Boundary Commission, 56 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 755 (2007). 
6
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Nevertheless, compared to the proximate agreement on the separation 
of acquisition and maintenance of title, the concept, application, and 
position of “critical date” and its relationship with intertemporal law, 
have rarely been deeply discussed.26  Interestingly, scholars usually 
leave the concept of intertemporal law and “critical date” highly 
intertwined and simultaneously call for further study of both.27 
The third approach is treaty interpretation, which has created two 
opposing debates. The first major debate was regarding the prima facie 
inconsistency of the methodology of interpretation before and after the 
1960s.  The second debate was whether treaty interpretation should be 
considered with the temporal application of law.28  Regarding the first 
debate about the inconsistency of the interpreting methodology, in cases 
before the 1960s, international courts and tribunals seemed to interpret 
treaties based on the initial intentions of parties at the time of conclusion 
of the treaties.29  Alternatively, in cases after the 1960s, international 
courts and tribunals tended to apply an evolutionary interpretation 
method.30  For the second debate, the intertemporal concern became a 
major issue in drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”), including Article 31’s interpretation rule.  Instead of 
interpreting a treaty’s terms with the relevant international law that 
existed at the time of the treaty’s conclusion, the VCLT’s Commission 
decided to officially adopt the evolutionary interpretation approach.31  
Those great scholars, including Shabtai Rosenne, Taslim O. Elias, 
Rosalyn Higgins, and Don Greig, either reviewed the VCLT’s 
                                                          
26. Elias concluded it as “not necessary.” ELIAS, supra note 4, at 129. 
27. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); LASSA 
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1955); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2014). 
28. The argument first arose by the Commission in Rights of Nationals Case, 
supra note 5, and was later further argued throughout the drafting process of Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
29. See, e.g., Rights of Nationals of United States of America in Morocco, 1952 
I.C.J. Rep. at 193; Grisbadarna, XI R.I.A.A. at 155. 
30. See, e.g., Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 2009 I.C.J. 
Rep. at 213; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. at 3; Right of Passage 
over India Territory, 1960 I.C.J. Rep. at 6. 
31. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT] art. 31(3)(c), May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context: [. . .] c. Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.”). 
7
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legislative history or further elaborated the treaty interpretation after the 
VCLT’s drafting.32  In 2014, Eirik Bjorge provided a plausible 
justification for both the evolutionary interpretation (as part of the 
traditional intentional interpretation instead of a challenge to that rule) 
and the consistency of evolutionary interpretation with international 
intertemporal law.33  Nevertheless, there has yet to be any consensus on 
the relationship and interaction between international intertemporal law 
and evolutionary treaty interpretation. 
Fourth, from the perspective of jurisprudence, while non-
retroaction is deemed an essential element of law, there seems to be a 
possibility of breaking through its border under certain circumstances.  
Great masters of political philosophy, like Thomas Hobbes, Lon Fuller, 
and John Rawls, emphasized the non-retroactive nature of law (nova 
constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis) and its vital 
position in legal constructions.34  Contrarily, positivists like Hans 
Kelsen challenged the non-retroaction of law.35 
It was a tragic disaster for all humankind when the Nazis utilized 
the retroaction of law to exert its violence upon innocent civilians 
during World War II (“WWII”). However, during the Nuremberg 
Trials, Nazis were tried by laws created after the war; which was highly 
controversial in regards to the new laws’ possible retroactive effect.  In 
response to that concern, Lon Fuller and John Rawls acknowledged a 
law could be deemed retroactive, under certain limited circumstance, if 
it were the only remedy available to redress such tremendous harm.36  
Dating back to the nineteenth century, Savigny predictably argued that 
the doctrine of non-retroaction is not one of universality.  First, based 
on “tempus regit actum,” the stability and authoritativeness of the law 
can secure people’s reasonable expectation.  Second, from the 
                                                          
32. See generally ELIAS, supra note 4; DON W. GREIG, INTERTEMPORALITY AND 
THE LAW OF TREATIES (2001); Rosalyn Higgins, Time and the Law: International 
Perspectives on an Old Problem, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 501 (1997); Shabtai 
Rosenne, The Temporal Application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
4 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (1970). 
33. EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 7–8 
(2014). 
34. See generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); THOMAS 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (2010); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999). 
35. See KELSEN, supra note 16. 
36. See RAWLS, supra note 34. 
8
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perspective of equity, the justification of law is the consensus for a 
whole nation and is part of the evolution of laws.  Thus, the latter should 
not be deemed as a deprivation of people’s vested right, like 
abolitionism.37  After Nuremberg, it has been broadly acknowledged 
that “an essential character of laws was held to be [applicable] only in 
the future.”38  Further, the VCLT stringently restricted the retroaction 
of jus cogens in Articles 53 and 62,39 and regional tribunals for human 
rights generally adhere to these non-retroactive principles.40 
Given all these fragments, admittedly the meaning and necessity to 
explore the system of international intertemporal law may be 
challenged.  Why should we care about the internal consistency of 
international intertemporal law?  Why should we try to unify the 
inconsistent system considering the obvious differences in the 
underlying areas?  Why should we not leave the issues isolated and 
settle the dispute case by case? 
It is a physicist’s fixed belief that the world must have originated 
from a simple, uniform, and beautiful formula.  The internal 
consistency of substances’ nature and the underlying unity of the 
physical world are deemed as equally essential as, if not more 
significant than, the accuracy of the final truths.  That is why after 
quantum mechanics took off the crown of the classic mechanics, it has 
continuously attempted to reconstruct a uniform system for the four 
fundamental interactions––gravitational interaction, electromagnetic 
interaction, strong nuclear, and weak nuclear.  For instance, Albert 
Einstein spent his last thirty years exploring unified field theory. 
Similarly, although usually based on plausible preconditions 
instead of scientific truths, the social science system is also expected to 
be self-consistent.  In the legal system, legitimacy, efficacy, and 
authority lie not only in the external legality, but also in its internal 
uniformity and consistency.  In that sense, international law never fails 
to receive criticism, doubt, and challenges on the law’s legitimacy, 
                                                          
37. See SAVIGNY, supra note 1. 
38. Smead, supra note 12, at 777. 
39. VCLT, supra note 31, arts. 53, 62. 
40. See generally Jeffrey B. Hall, Just a Matter of Time? Expanding the 
Temporal Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court to Address Cold War Wrongs, 14 
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 679, 681 (2008). 
9
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authority, and functionality.41  Nevertheless, if we still deem or intend 
to build onto international law as real law, we cannot leave the 
fragments isolated under a “case by case” situation without initially 
attempting to construct a consistent international legal system.  Even on 
a practical level, the very authority of international courts and tribunals 
lies in the decisions as well as in the internal uniformity of the rationale 
behind the decisions.  This further explains why as early as the 
nineteenth century, Savigny explored the theory of the conflict of law 
in respect of location.  Although it was not a practical comparison at the 
time, Savigny predicted the possible significance and application of 
conflict of law in respect of time on the international level 
simultaneously.  In Savigny’s eyes, there must be a logical, 
symmetrical, uniform, and elegant system of the conflict of law. 
Consequently, the author’s passion for this topic originates from 
the simple belief that, coexistent with the diversity of disputes in 
different areas, there must be a uniform and consistent system behind 
them, as long as the same concept “intertemporal law” is engaged. 
Further, in response to Herbert Hart’s argument that international law 
is a primitive legal system since it is made up only of primary rules and 
lacks secondary rules,42 international intertemporal law also contributes 
to optimize the international legal system—a mature legal system 
including both primary law rules as well as secondary law rules. 
                                                          
41. One classical challenge is, is international law real law?: 
It is indeed arguable, as we shall show, that international law not only lacks 
the secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislature 
and courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying “sources” of 
law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules. These 
differences are indeed striking and the question “Is international law really 
law?” can hardly be put aside. 
HERBERT HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (1994). 
42. Id. 
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol48/iss2/6
Li camera ready (2) (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2018  9:46 AM 
2018] INTERNATIONAL INTERTEMPORAL LAW 351 
II. INTERTEMPORAL LAW AS A SECONDARY LAW RULE IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
A.  The Concept and Structure of Intertemporal Law 
1.  Concept 
Before introducing the concept of intertemporal law, the author 
feels obliged to clarify the terminology used in this Article, namely 
“intertemporal law,” to avoid unnecessary confusion in the later 
discussion.  In the kingdom of jurisprudence, various structures of law 
have been built by great jurists, including Herbert Hart,43 Ronal 
Dworkin,44 and Joseph Raz45  However, similar to other fundamental 
questions of law, no consensus has ever been reached on this issue.  
Below is a diagram built by Raz that, while not the only correct answer, 
provides a persuasive understanding of the structure of law.  The point 
to be drawn from the existence of a certain structure of law, 
disregarding how controversial it may be, is that there are indeed 
differences among: the descriptive definition of a legal situation, the 
regulative rule governing a legal situation; the recognitory rule 
determining what regulative rule to apply; and the general principle 
behind the regulative rule or recognitory rule. 
Table 1 – Raz’s Diagram of the Structure of Law46 
                                                          
43. See id. 
44. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 45 (1967). 
45. See generally Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE 
L. J. 823 (1972). 
46. Id. at 824 n.4. 
11
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It is common that different terminologies would be utilized to refer 
to the definition of a legal situation, as opposed to the rule governing it 
or the principle behind it.  However, for intertemporal law, there may 
be mixed terminology that consists of the descriptive definition of the 
legal situation, the rule governing the legal situation, and the principle 
behind that.  To avoid confusion, “intertemporal law” will be utilized 
to refer to the whole abstract idea, “the definition of international law,” 
“the rule of international law,” and “the principle of intertemporal law” 
for the subsidiary concepts respectively.  To clarify, there is no distinct 
border between the rule and the principle of intertemporal law, as they 
are usually used interchangeably.  The terminology the “nature of 
intertemporal law” or the “jurisprudence of intertemporal law” may 
also be used to reveal the rationale behind the legal norm, namely the 
antinomy of stability and evolution.47 
Now we come to the definition of international intertemporal law.  
From the perspective of one single international law, intertemporal law 
might be deemed as the temporal application of law.  As Savigny 
indicated, the operation of law is limited in space and time.48  From the 
perspective of the international legal system, intertemporal law could 
be deemed as the conflict of laws in respect of time.  If one looks from 
a certain point of time in the history of international disputes, 
intertemporal law might be described as the choice of law at a certain 
point or period of time.  Although the results seem to differ from various 
angles, it is indeed one legal concept.  For the purpose of this study, 
intertemporal law will be defined as the temporal application of law or 
the conflict of law in respect to time.  As will be explained further 
below, the “temporal application of law” is more suitable for the 
negative conflict, while the “conflict of law in respect of time” matches 
the positive conflict better. 
                                                          
47. Here, the author has to apologize for, to some extent, the chaos and lack of 
rigor of the terminology, and the consequent confusion that might bring about. Since 
there is nearly no sample to follow, it is the author’s hope that further studies, 
challenges, criticism or even alternative modes could be made on this issue. 
48. See SAVIGNY, supra note 1, at 307–74. 
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As indicated above, intertemporal law not only refers to the 
existence of the legal issue of temporal application, but also to the rule, 
or doctrine, on how to decide temporal application. In 1928, Huber 
introduced the rule of intertemporal law for the first time, indicating 
that “a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law 
contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a 
dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.”49  This principle is 
widely accepted in literature50 and numerous judicial decisions.51 
Then the question becomes, what is the position of the rule of 
international intertemporal law in the international legal system?  
According to Hart’s theory, legal rules can be divided into primary law 
rules and secondary law rules; the former of which specifies the rights 
and standards of acts for the subjects of international law, while the 
latter establishes the methods for identification and development.52  The 
International Law Commission (“ILC”), when drafting the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
                                                          
49. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. 
50. See generally Fitzmaurice, supra note 22; Goldie, supra note 8; ROSENNE, 
supra note 22. 
51. See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 47; Fisheries, 1951 
I.C.J. Rep. at 116; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 
53. 
52. See HART, supra note 41. 
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regarded such responsibility rules as secondary law rules.53  Similarly, 
the rule of international intertemporal law itself does not create rights 
or responsibilities among states, but provides the settlement of temporal 
conflicts of laws based on the rights and responsibilities created in 
different areas of primary law rules.  Such characteristics of the rule of 
intertemporal law successfully explain why the approaches differ 
substantially, prima facie, among different kinds of dispute 
settlements.54  Further, it also answers the confusion of leading authors, 
such as Shaw.55 Just like the puzzle of “fault” in state responsibility, 
which is generally due to the ambiguous appraisal of rights and 
responsibilities in the primary law rules, the inchoate and inconsistent 
performance of the rule of international intertemporal law is largely 
based on the uncertainty and immaturity of the primary law rules. 
In brief, the findings in this part are concluded as follows: 
Rule 1: (Definition) International intertemporal law is the temporal 
application of international law or the conflict of international law in 
respect of time. 
Rule 1.1: (The rule of) International intertemporal law is a 
secondary law rule and the settlement of disputes depends on the 
primary law rules it is based on. 
                                                          
53. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility]. 
These articles seek to formulate, by way of codification and progressive 
development, the basic rules of international law concerning the 
responsibility of States for their internationally wrongful acts. The emphasis 
is on the secondary rules of State responsibility: that is to say, the general 
conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible 
for wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow 
therefrom. The articles do not attempt to define the content of the 
international obligations, the breach of which gives rise to responsibility. 
This is the function of the primary rules, whose codification would involve 
restating most of the substantive customary and conventional international 
law. 
Id. at 31. 
54. Actually, the conflict of law, be it conflict of law in respect of time or place, 
is secondary law rule. Such characteristic can be dated back to the origin of private 
international law centuries before. That is why Savigny used the theory of “seats” to 
explain the prima facial diversity and the internal consistency of conflict of law. 
55. See generally SHAW, supra note 27. 
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2.  Intertemporal Law and Critical Date 
Before diving into the structure of intertemporal law, one cannot 
ignore the concept of “critical date.”  In Island of Palmas, the island 
was first discovered by Spain in the sixteenth century, and title was 
legally acquired according to international law at that time.  Later, it 
was occupied by the Netherlands who exercised a “continuous and 
peaceful display of sovereignty” over the island from 1677.  In 1898, it 
was ceded to the United States from Spain in their Treaty of Paris.  
Huber deemed that year as the “critical date,” the consolidation time of 
the dispute.56 
 
Nevertheless, compared to the approximate agreement on the 
separation of acquisition and maintenance of title and the principle of 
intertemporal law,57 the method of “critical date” was not usually 
discussed seriously,58 and while sometimes argued by parties, 
                                                          
56. See Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. 
57. See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 47; Fisheries, 1951 
I.C.J. Rep. at 116; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 
53; see also JENNINGS, supra note 10. 
58. Elias concluded it as “not necessary.” ELIAS, supra note 4, at 129. 
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international courts and tribunal often rejected the concept.59  On the 
other hand, some leading authors have made the concepts of 
intertemporal law and “critical date” highly intertwined, at times even 
equating them to each other.60 
Through an analysis of the leading cases by the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (“PCA”), Permanent Court of International Justice 
(“PCIJ”), and International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), there are three 
common ways critical date has been utilized: (a) the 
consolidation/solidification of a certain right to exclude subsequent 
efforts to change that right; (b) the crystallization of a certain dispute in 
international dispute settlements in order to exclude subsequent facts; 
and (c) critical date as the concept coincided with the time of the change 
of law and, consequently, as the concept used interchangeably with 
intertemporal law.61 
a. Critical date used to consolidate and solidify rights 
to exclude subsequent efforts to change those rights 
It is easier as a theory to understand that certain rights do not stay 
unchanged over time than as a practical solution to answer when the 
rights are created, consolidated/solidified/vested, or later changed.  
Thus, a critical date related to the consolidation of a certain right is 
almost solely theoretical considering that primary international law 
rules themselves are far from mature.  Hence, it is extremely hard to 
discern the status of certain international rights. Yet, implications can 
be drawn from case law. 
First, in territorial law, one of the significant findings made by 
Huber in Island of Palmas is that “a distinction must be made between 
the creation of rights and the existence of rights.”62  Correspondingly, 
                                                          
59. See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 47 (where the Court 
remained silent in choosing critical date); Frontier (Arg. v. Chile) XVI R.I.A.A. 109, 
120 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1969) (where arbitral tribunal refused to choose critical date). 
60. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 27; OPPENHEIM, supra note 27. 
61. This classification is different from the most famous literature on the critical 
date, namely Goldie, supra note 8, at 1266–67. Goldie made three categories of how 
critical date is usually used: (1) the evidentiary notion to exclude the subsequent facts 
concerning a certain dispute; (2) a concept related to ratione temporis; and (3) a 
consolidation of disputes. Id. 
62. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. 
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Huber found that the title established through discovery by Spain was 
merely an inchoate right that was not consolidated by effective 
sovereign activities.63  On the other hand, “the Netherlands title of 
sovereignty, acquired by continuous and peaceful display of State 
authority during a long period of time going probably back beyond the 
year 1700, therefore holds good.”64 This case referred to the Treaty of 
Paris in 1898 as the critical date for the dispute, but did not indicate a 
critical date or period for the consolidation/solidification of title.  
However, it can be implied that since the rights developed over time 
from creation (inchoate right) to existence, there should be a date or 
period when the right was consolidated/solidified/vested. 
Similarly, in Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Denmark 
successfully established valid title by effective sovereign activities 
before Norway’s efforts.65  Additionally, in Minquiers and Ecrehos, the 
ICJ favored the United Kingdom by giving greater weight to its exercise 
of jurisdiction and administration to decide the consolidation of the 
sovereign right.66  Although when exactly such territorial sovereignty 
by one state was consolidated has never been explicitly defined in these 
cases, it is believed that the original understanding of “title” is in the 
vested facts that international law recognizes as creating a sovereign 
right.67  Additionally, these cases show the concept of 
consolidation/solidification might be utilized to establish a good root of 
territorial title.68  Jennings, in his work on the discussion of acquisition 
of territory, stated that there might be several types of critical dates, and 
consequently it is probably difficult and even misleading to find its 
general concept.69 
In addition to territorial sovereignty, the historic rights in maritime 
delimitation can serve as another example to discuss the existence of 
critical date as the time of the consolidation of the right.  In Fisheries, 
                                                          
63. Id. at 846. 
64. Id. at 868. 
65. Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. at 116; see also Legal Status of Eastern 
Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 53.  
66. Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 47. 
67. Sir Robert Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, in 
COLLECTED WRITING OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS, Vol. 2, 936 (1998). 
68. D. H. N. Johnson, Consolidation as a Root of Title in International Law, 13 
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 215 (1955). 
69. See JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 31–35. 
17
Li: International Intertemporal Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2018
Li camera ready (2) (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2018  9:46 AM 
358 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48 
Norwegian fishermen exercised their fishing activities from 1616 to 
1618, centuries before the British fishing vessels appeared in the same 
area in 1906.70  When the issue of the validity of the delimitation lines 
of the Norwegian fishery zone came before the ICJ, the Court found 
that “the Norwegian authorities applied their system of delimitation 
consistently and uninterruptedly from 1869 until the time when the 
dispute arose.”71  Thus, it can be reasoned that at a certain critical date 
or critical period, such historic fishing rights were 
consolidated/solidified/vested.  Admittedly, the problem is the same as 
that for territorial sovereignty––what is the qualitative and quantitative 
criteria for the consolidation/solidification of a certain right?  Perhaps, 
no one knows the answer. 
A third example can be examined from when the right to exercise 
diplomatic protection was consolidated in Nottebohm.72  The case is 
heavily criticized for two main reasons.  First, that nationality is deemed 
wholly a domestic issue and, therefore, the Court shall not interfere in 
a state’s right of deciding diplomatic protection.  And, second because 
there is no such requirement of “genuine connection”73 in respect of 
nationality, as subsequently reflected in Article 4 of the Draft Articles 
on Diplomatic Protection.74  In the case, Nottebohm, a German citizen, 
went to Guatemala, lived there, and settled his business mainly there 
since 1905.  In 1939, Nottebohm returned to Germany and began to 
visit Liechtenstein frequently.  In 1939, Nottebohm applied for 
Liechtenstein nationality and was soon after admitted.  In 1940, he 
returned to Guatemala for business.  In 1943, Nottebohm was arrested 
as an enemy, and his property was retained since Guatemala had entered 
into WWII against Germany.  After he was released in 1946, 
Nottebohm began to reside permanently in Liechtenstein.  In 1949, 
                                                          
70. Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. at 124. 
71. Id. at 138. 
72. See Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 6). 
73. Id. at 23. 
74. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 54, art. 4, cmt. (5) (It is 
elaborated that “Draft article 4 does not require a State to prove an effective or genuine 
link between itself and its national, along the lines suggested in the Nottebohm case,” 
and that “the Court did not intend to expound a general rule applicable to States but 
only a relative rule according to which a State in Liechtenstein’s position was required 
to show a genuine link between itself and Mr. Nottebohm in order to permit it to claim 
on his behalf against Guatemala with whom he had extremely close ties.”). 
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Guatemala expropriated Nottebohm’s property.75  When the issue of 
whether the situation of Nottebohm entitled Liechtenstein to exercise 
its right of diplomatic protection came before the ICJ, the Court held 
that “at the date when he applied for the naturalization” in 
Liechtenstein, “his actual connections with Liechtenstein were 
extremely tenuous.”76  Thus, the Court’s decision shows that the right 
to exercise diplomatic protection was not yet consolidated at the Court’s 
chosen critical date, the date of application. 
In conclusion, critical date related to the consolidation of a certain 
right is more theoretical than a practical rule.  There is nothing to 
suggest that any international court, arbitral tribunal, or party has 
convincingly established when exactly a certain right was 
consolidated/solidified/vested.  This might explain why the ICJ, in 
Minquiers and Ecrehos, left the choice of critical date an open question 
and depicted the critical date as an evidentiary rule, rather than a 
substantive one.77  Further, we should always bear in mind that it might 
be possible that even if a certain right has been 
solidified/consolidated/vested, it does not mean that right has not been 
changed since that point.  It might depend on what kind of change 
occurs and to what extent the change makes a difference.78  As with 
many aspects of law, there are always exceptions.  The ICJ alluded to 
this concept in Minquiers and Ecrehos when it expressed that, even 
under the rule of evidential exclusion of the facts after the critical date, 
there could be “special circumstances” that need to be taken into 
consideration.79  This will be discussed in the next part. 
b. Critical date used to crystallize certain disputes in 
international dispute settlements in order to exclude subsequent facts 
Critical date was first introduced in Island of Palmas.  Huber 
deemed 1898, the year of the Treaty of Paris, as the critical date to 
decide the applicable law and stated that the events in 1898 could not 
                                                          
75. See Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. at 13–18. 
76. Id. at 25. 
77. See Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 47. 
78. CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 69. 
79. Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 59–60. 
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indicate the legal situation of the island.80  The concept of critical date 
was then elaborated upon in Minquiers and Ecrehos.  Both France and 
the U.K. came up with a critical date respectively as indicating the time 
of the crystallization of the disputes to exclude the subsequent acts by 
the other state.81 
Minquiers and Ecrehos is of importance in two ways.  First, both 
parties’ arguments might be the clearest and most concrete analysis of 
critical date.  In fact, the ICJ and other international tribunals frequently 
quote those arguments.  Second, the ICJ chose not to decide upon the 
critical date but instead acknowledged it as an evidential rule to exclude 
evidence while at the same time leaving space for exceptions.82 
Regarding the parties’ arguments, both parties greatly assisted in 
the discussion of the concept of critical date.  For example, one argued 
that it is “normally, not the date when the dispute was born, but that on 
which it crystallized into a concrete issue . . . . One object of the critical 
date is to prevent one of the parties from unilaterally improving its 
position by means of some step taken after . . . .”83  Furthermore, the 
date can only be determined after all the final positions have been taken 
by the parties.84  Among the arguments presented, Sir Fitzmaurice, 
counsel for the U.K., offered the strongest voice.  He stated that critical 
date is “the date on which the differences of opinion that have arisen 
between the parties have crystallized into a concrete issue giving rise to 
a formal dispute,”85 and “[t]ime is deemed to stop at that date. Nothing 
that happens afterward can operate to change the situation that then 
existed.”86  As plausible justification for the necessity of such critical 
date, he argued that justice requires it.87 For the latter important way, 
the spaces the Court left for subsequent cases seem to have lead to the 
                                                          
80. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 865–68. 
81. See Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 47 (France argued for 
1839, the date of the bilateral convention, while the UK asked for the date of 1950 of 
the special agreement.). 
82. Id. at 64. 
83. Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Minquiers and Ecrehos (U.K. v. 
Fr.), 1953 I.C.J. Pleadings 10, 68 (Sept. 17, 1953 to Oct. 8, 1953, Nov. 17, 1953) 
[hereinafter Pleadings]. 
84. Id. at 68. 
85. Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 47. 
86. Pleadings, supra note 83, at 64, 69; BLUM, supra note 10, at 208. 
87. Pleadings, supra note 83, at 67–68. 
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result of disuse.  In Frontier, for instance, the tribunal held that it “has 
considered the notion of the critical date to be of little value in the 
present litigation and has examined all the evidence submitted to it . . . 
.”88 
Since critical date has been utilized in dispute settlement several 
times,89 critical date as the concept related to the crystallization of a 
certain dispute means the exclusionary and terminal date of the 
disputes.90  After that date, the subsequent facts or the parties’ acts can 
no longer affect the disputes.91  Theoretically, the issue of critical date 
would certainly arise whenever the question of time constitutes a 
necessary part of the dispute.92  However, in practice, only Legal Status 
of Eastern Greenland followed the steps of the sample set forth in 
Island of Palmas.  In Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Norway 
discovered Eastern Greenland in the tenth century; however, the Nordic 
colonies on the west coast disappeared by the thirteenth or 
fourteenth century.  Prior to 1814, the King of Denmark exercised 
sovereignty over Greenland for centuries in his capacity as the 
King of Norway.93  When the sovereign dispute came before the PCIJ, 
the Court deemed the critical date as July 10, 1931, when Norway 
proclaimed its sovereignty against Denmark.94  The Court’s decision 
was based on the fact that Denmark had established valid title via 
                                                          
88. Frontier, XVI R.I.A.A. at 167. 
89. The cases that explicitly use critical date for the consolidation of the disputes 
are as follow: Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belg. v. Bulg.), Judgment, 
1939 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 77 (Apr. 4); Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 
P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 53; Phosphates in Morocco (It. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. 
(Seri. A/B) No. 74 (June 14); Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. However, the author 
would argue that the critical date or crucial date or material date that mentioned in the 
cases concerning ratione temporis (Phosphates in Morocco; Electricity Company of 
Sofia and Bulgaria), is not the same thing that is discussed here. Since the latter does 
not have exclusionary effect for the subsequent facts. As long as the disputes occur 
after the time that the temporal jurisdiction is satisfied, it does not matter to which 
stage the disputes have developed. Usually, subsequent facts would certainly be taken 
into consideration. 
90.  Goldie, supra note 8, at 1251. 
91.  D. H. N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 332, 342 (1950). 
92.  Goldie, supra note 8, at 1256. 
93.  Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. at 27–44. 
94.  Id. at 75. 
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effective sovereign activities before that date and declared Norwegian 
occupation after that date unlawful and invalid.95 
The critical date is commonly difficult to determine and may not 
always be necessary to do so in a dispute settlement.96  Often, when a 
dispute occurs under these circumstances, neither party will have 
developed any convincing historic title or right.  In other words, the 
element of time does not play a significant role in the dispute.  
Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration by the PCA in 1981 serves as a classic 
example of where the issues of land and maritime boundary are 
involved, given that the historic Arab world was unfamiliar with the 
idea of defined and fixed boundaries.97 
In Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration, the disputed coast was controlled by 
two confederacies of tribes before the nineteenth century.  However, in 
1937 and 1951, the U.K. twice intervened and attempted to establish 
clear boundaries.  During those periods, the Arab world was unaware 
of the idea of defined and fixed boundaries.  In 1971, the U.K. withdrew 
from the coast and at the same time the United Arab Emirates was 
established. This brought friction concerning territorial boundaries to 
the two neighbors, Dubai and Sharjah, and finally led to the 1981 
Arbitration.98 
In that arbitration, Sharjah heavily relied on Sir Fitzmaurice’s idea 
on critical date99 and, accordingly, advanced two alternative critical 
dates, 1955 and December 2, 1971.100  Conversely, Dubai made strong 
arguments to challenge the concept of critical date.  First, Dubai pointed 
out that in cases that decided historic sovereign right over territory––of 
which Island of Palmas and Legal Status of Eastern Greenland serve 
as classic examples––critical date might be meaningful to confirm such 
preexisting title.  Dubai further argued that in cases where no such 
historic title has been perfectly established, the concept of critical date 
                                                          
95.  Id. 
96.  See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 47 (ICJ left the 
question of critical date open); Frontier, XVI R.I.A.A. at 167 (tribunal found the 
critical date of little value in dispute settlement). 
97.  D. W. Bowett, The Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration of 1981, BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 
103, 104 (1994). 
98.  Id. at 103–07. 
99.  See, e.g., Pleadings, supra note 83, at 68–69. 
100. Bowett, supra note 97, at 111. 
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has no room to play.101  Second, there is no such rule in international 
law that one party is not allowed to improve its right by unilateral action 
after a certain time.  Moreover, the rule is actually based on a foundation 
of the weight of the evidence, which allows the Court or tribunal’s 
discretion to judge the case in its totality.102  The tribunal accepted 
Dubai’s arguments and denied the validity of the critical date.  The 
tribunal’s reasoning relied on the fact that the issue before it was to 
decide to whom the disputed boundary areas belonged,103 and no 
dispute had been crystallized since both parties changed their positions 
over time.104 
Dubai/Sharjah Arbitration perfectly reflects the limits and fragility 
of critical date as the concept related to the crystallization of a certain 
dispute.  On one hand, the crystallization of disputes depends on the 
development of the underlying rights over time, the regulatory rule of 
which remains largely uncertain or unknown.  On the other hand, such 
crystallization depends on the parties’ behavior over time as well.  Since 
the modes of development of rights were European-centered throughout 
a majority of history––and the more primitive status of other parts of 
the world were ignored––there is a huge gap in the methodology of 
legal analysis in various cases concerning different parties’ disputes in 
different areas. 
In conclusion, although critical date as the concept related to the 
crystallization of a certain dispute is of more practical use compared to 
critical date used to solidify a certain right, it is still far from certainty. 
c. Critical date as the concept related to uti possidetis 
Neither Huber, Sir Fitzmaurice, nor Goldie would have predicted 
the following repeated use of critical date interchangeably with 
intertemporal law in the cases concerning uti possidetis.105  The 
                                                          
101. Id. at 112. 
102. Id. at 113. 
103. Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, 91 I.L.R. 543, 594 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1981). 
104. Bowett, supra note 97, at 114. 
105. The cases that critical date is used interchangeably with intertemporal law 
are as follow: Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and 
South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 12 (May 23); Territorial 
and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. 
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principle of uti possidetis was first invoked in Latin America in the 
context of decolonization to settle boundary disputes.106  This principle 
means “when a colony gains independence, the colonial boundaries are 
accepted as the boundaries of the newly independent state.”107  Uti 
possidetis was later widely acknowledged in African regimes.  The 
resolution of the Organization of African Unity explicitly established 
the doctrine that the colonial borders existing at the date of 
independence became a tangible reality, which should be respected by 
all member states as consolidated boundaries.108 
The ICJ and PCA have consistently deemed the date of 
independence as the critical date and applied the doctrine of uti 
possidetis as the intertemporal law, looking to when the boundaries 
were consolidated and consequently decided at the time of 
independence.  This may sound like circular reasoning.  Indeed, the 
choice of critical date and the application of uti possidetis is a legal 
fiction, as the result of the maximum consensus in the decolonization 
context. 
In Frontier Dispute, the issue before the ICJ was the determination 
of the line of the frontier between Burkina Faso and the Republic of 
Mali, both of which used to be part of the French colonies.109  In this 
classic case, the Court made the following famous statement concerning 
uti possidetis and the critical date: 
The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing 
respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when 
                                                          
v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 659 (Oct. 8); Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 90 (July 12); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 625 (Dec. 17); Land, Island 
and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. 351 
(Sept. 11); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 554 (Dec. 22); Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, XXII R.I.A.A. 211 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1998). 
106. See, e.g., Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. at 
565; Colombia-Venezuela Boundary Award, 1 R.I.A.A. 223, 228 (1922). 
107. GRAHAM GOOCH & MICHAEL WILLIAMS, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (2007), http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv 
.nl:2048/view/10.1093/acref/9780192807021.001.0001/acref-9780192807021-e-
3116. 
108. SHAW, supra note 27, at 380–81; S.C. Res. 1234 (Apr. 9, 1999). 
109. See Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at 564–65. 
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independence is achieved. Such territorial boundaries might be no 
more than delimitations between different administrative divisions 
or colonies all subject to the same sovereign. In that case, the 
application of the principle of uti possidetis resulted in administrative 
boundaries being transformed into international frontiers in the full 
sense of the term.110 
The Court made it clear the doctrine’s objective was “to prevent the 
independence and stability of new states being endangered by 
fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following 
the withdrawal of the administering power.”111  And same as the 
previous usage of the critical date, on the date of independence, the 
frontiers were consolidated just like “the photograph of the territory” 
on that date.112  This means that all actions by the parties after that date 
would be excluded in settling the dispute. 
Following Frontier Dispute, the ICJ in Land, Island and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute decided on the boundary and maritime delimitation 
between El Salvador and Honduras with the same doctrine.  Again, the 
date of independence was deemed as the critical date.  However, the 
Court rejected the argument the date of independence was the only 
possible critical date.  The Court clarified that while the date of 
independence was indeed decisive and must be the critical date for the 
uti possidetis, there could be other critical dates afterward, for example, 
one arisen from a boundary treaty.113 
In Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, the ICJ 
determined the boundary between Indonesia and Malaysia by using 
1969, the date of independence, as the critical date. The Court indicated 
that it would only consider facts that occurred before the critical date, 
when the dispute was crystallized.114 
A recent case dealing with these concepts is the Frontier Dispute 
in 2005, where the ICJ decided that the boundary between Benin and 
Niger was determined by the uti possidetis rather than the colonial law 
                                                          
110. Id. at 566. 
111. Id. at 565. 
112. Id. at 568. 
113. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 67. 
114. See Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and 
South Ledge, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. at 12. 
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on the date of independence.115  Additionally, in Territorial and 
Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean 
Sea in 2007, the ICJ chose two critical dates for the land and maritime 
delimitation respectively, following the uti possidetis as the date of 
independence.116 
Although the case law of critical date concerning uti possidetis as a 
legal basis appears to be more consistent, and perhaps more convincing 
than the previous two usages, the examples above are rather ideal.  This 
is especially true given the fact that this usage itself is of the color of 
legal fiction.  In the cases where there was no clear colonial law used to 
govern the land and the maritime areas, as well as where the titles were 
interrupted several times before and remained vague at the time of 
independence, this method alone may provide more questions than 
answers. 
This is exactly the case in Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, which is 
famous for its complexity and the combination of the methods used to 
solve the disputes (i.e., historic rights, effectivités, uti possidetis, and 
natural unity).  For instance, on the question of effectivités the tribunal 
found the situation checkered where the interests and position of the 
parties constantly changed over the years with several periods of 
interruption and the legal position of the disputed islands remained 
indeterminate for most of the time.117  Ultimately, the tribunal failed to 
find any critical date and decided to follow the Argentina and Chile 
Arbitration in 1996, which held that it would examine “all the evidence 
submitted to it, irrespective of the date of the acts to which such 
evidence relates.”118 
d. Critical date and intertemporal law 
Although usually intertwined, critical date does not logically 
affiliate with intertemporal law.  Indeed, the two concepts share the 
same concerns of the development of rights and disputes on the 
dimension of time.  They are separate and independent rules of 
recognition (secondary law rules) in the sense that the precondition of 
                                                          
115. See Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at 554. 
116. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in 
the Caribbean Sea, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. at 659. 
117. Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, XXII R.I.A.A. ¶ 456. 
118. Frontier, XVI R.I.A.A. at 115. 
26
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol48/iss2/6
Li camera ready (2) (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2018  9:46 AM 
2018] INTERNATIONAL INTERTEMPORAL LAW 367 
critical date is the presumable existence of a rather mature legal system 
where the evolution of rights and disputes precisely follows a certain 
mode (i.e. an inchoate situation to a consolidated situation).  However, 
intertemporal law mainly focuses on the application of law on the 
dimension of time.  The two may overlap when the changing modes of 
the underlying rights are capable of triggering the issue of critical date; 
otherwise, the issue of intertemporal law can be solved even where such 
mode of evolution is uncertain or unknown.  In other words, the 
resolution of an intertemporal law problem does not necessarily rely on 
the discernment of the critical date.  Nor does a critical date issue only 
arise in the context of intertemporal law.  Usually, critical date is 
utilized when settling a direct positive conflict of law in respect of time, 
rather than an indirect positive conflict (treaty interpretation) or 
negative conflict (non-retroaction and ratione temporis). 
Nevertheless, the study of the critical date is significant to the study 
of intertemporal law in three ways.  First, the two issues both arise when 
time is a necessary element to the development of rights, disputes, or 
law.  Although the two concepts are both secondary law rules, 
intertemporal law might be “more secondary,” given the fact that the 
development of rights/disputes on the dimension of time might serve as 
a prerequisite when deciding the corresponding applicable law.  
Second, the reason behind the limits and unresolved areas in both 
concepts share great similarities; that is, the diversities, fragmentation, 
and immaturity of the underlying primary international law rules.  
Third, the theoretically uniform and consistent systems of either 
concept are usually fragmented.  This fragmentation, to some extent, is 
due to the unbalanced development of, the diverse understanding of, 
and the different compliance with international law around the world.  
All these might still leave international law as a rather primitive system, 
where it is hard to build concrete secondary law rules like intertemporal 
law. 
In conclusion, the rules that can be summarized from this section 
are as follows: 
Rule 2: International intertemporal law and critical date are 
separate concepts. Critical date is not an internal or subsidiary concept 
of intertemporal law. 
Rule 2.1: Only part of the international intertemporal law issues 
can be settled by, but not necessarily, critical date. 
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Rule 2.2: Critical date is a secondary law rule based on the 
underlying development of the rights or the disputes. 
3.  The Structure of International Intertemporal Law:  
A Uniform System 
The definition of international intertemporal law can be seen from 
different angles and in different ways: the temporal application of law, 
the conflict of law in respect of time, and the choice of law at a certain 
time or period.  However, they are actually in one system of 
intertemporal law where the basic rule was introduced in Island of 
Palmas.  “[A] judicial fact must be appreciated in the light of the law 
contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a 
dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.”119 
Despite the immaturity of primary law rules and the difficulties in 
establishing secondary law rules, it is worth trying to build a framework 
for a uniform and consistent system of international intertemporal law.  
For this purpose, the author will first divide the system into two parts: 
the positive conflict and the negative conflict.  For the former, two laws 
exist on the dimension of time.  For the latter, only one international 
law was created at a certain time of history, before which there was no 
rule to govern.  For positive conflict, there are two sub-categories: the 
direct conflict of law, where territorial disputes serve as a classical 
example; and the indirect conflict of law, namely treaty interpretation.  
For negative conflict, there are also two sub-categories: non-
                                                          
119. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. 
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retroaction, which is substantive; and ratione temporis, which is 
procedural. 
 
  The following parts will analyze each category of intertemporal 
law respectively. Although the underlying primary law rules usually 
remain uncertain or unknown, and the precise rule of intertemporal law 
varies case by case, the basic rule is concluded as below: 
Rule 3: The basic rule of international intertemporal law: A 
juridical issue shall be decided in the light of the law contemporary 
with it. 
B.  Active Conflict 
1.  Direct Conflict, Territorial Dispute as Example 
a. Several issues in territorial law: title, right, 
modes of acquisition, effectivités, and uti possidetis 
Over time, leading authors have reiterated the vital role of territory 
in international law. Jennings indicated, “[T]he mission and purpose of 
traditional international law has been the delimitation of the exercise of 
sovereign power on a territorial basis.”120  O’Connell regards it as 
“perhaps the fundamental concept of international law.”121  
International law governing territorial acquisition is rooted in Roman 
                                                          
120. Jennings, supra note 67, at 934. 
121. D.P. O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. I, 403 (1970); see Jennings, 
supra note 67, at 935. 
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Law dealing with private ownership of property.122 Before turning to 
the intertemporal law issue, it is important to discuss several vital, but 
controversial, issues on territorial law. 
Above all, what is the difference between title and territorial rights; 
and what are the characteristics of international territorial law compared 
to municipal law?  Interestingly, Glanville Williams argued that “title 
is the de facto antecedent, of which the right is the de jure 
consequent.”123  In Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, the PCIJ found 
title to territory under international law more relative than absolute.124  
Later, in Minquiers and Ecrehos, the ICJ held that it would consider all 
the relevant evidence to decide who owned a better title.125  As Jennings 
concluded, “the primary meaning of ‘title’ is the vestitive facts that the 
law recognizes as creating a right.”126  In Frontier Dispute and Land, 
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, the ICJ confirmed that the word 
“title” not only means documentary evidence used to establish a certain 
right, but is any evidence of such right.127 
Second, what are the acquisition methods of territorial sovereignty 
in international law? Jennings created the following classic 
categorization: occupation; prescription; cession; accession or 
accretion; and subjugation or conquest.128  However, both Jennings and 
Lauterpacht found that the categorization above to be methods for the 
existing state as datum, not the case for the creation of a new 
statehood.129  Lauterpacht further argued that, although the creation of 
a new statehood is a matter of law,130 the method used for territorial 
                                                          
122. See, e.g., JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 935; O’CONNELL, supra note 121, at 
404. 
123. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 378 (1957). 
124. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 53, at 
46. 
125. Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 52. 
126. JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 936. 
127. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1992 I.C.J. Rep. at 388; 
Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at 564. 
128. JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 939. 
129. Id.; see also OPPENHEIM, supra note 27, at 544. 
130. On the question whether the creation of a new statehood is a matter of fact 
or law, the leading scholars divide, for instance, Oppenheim regards it as a matter of 
fact and deems recognition as the legal issue while Brownlie held the completely 
opposite view. 
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acquisition before state recognition is irrelevant.131  Jennings 
summarized this significant phenomenon as follows: 
For transfers of territory between existing States the law lays down 
a series of modes through which alone a valid title to the sovereignty 
may be passed from one to the other; but for a territorial change 
coincident with the birth of a new State the law apparently not only 
fails to provide any modes of transfer but appears to be actually 
indifferent as to how the acquisition is accomplished.132 
Jennings further analyzed that the acquisition of territory for a 
newly created state is more relevant to municipal law, either 
constitutional law or colonial law, than to the international law.133  
Other scholars supported this view, especially in the context of 
decolonization.134  Oppenheim suggested international law is better 
suited to factually accept the position of a territory at the moment of the 
creation of a new state.135 
In response to the differences in territorial acquisition by existing 
states, and by newly created states, the vital features vary accordingly.  
For territorial acquisition by existing states, effectivités is a common 
feature.136  Rooted in Roman law, which requires corpus and animus,137 
and resembling the private law of property in land,138 effectivités did 
not come into force until the sixteenth century.  Before effectivités came 
into force, a mere discovery with intent to occupy served as the creation 
of title.139  Ever since the sixteenth century, as Huber concluded in 
                                                          
131. OPPENHEIM, supra note 27, at 544. 
132. JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 941. 
133. Id. 
134. See, e.g., Elihu Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United 
Kingdom in the Field of International Law––Survey and Comment, V, 7 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 534 (1958). There the questions are discussed like what legal status in 
international law of the Indian Independence Order was in 1947, and what the 
Inheritance Agreements between U.K. and Ghana, U.K. and Malaya were under 
international law. 
135. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 27, at 537–44. 
136. See JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 937. 
137. See The Fama, 165 Eng. Rep. 714 (1804). 
138. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW Chap. III (1927). 
139. JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 937. 
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Island of Palmas, “the actual continuous and peaceful display of state 
functions is in case of dispute the sound and natural criterion of 
territorial sovereignty.”140  As for territorial acquisition by newly 
created states, as analyzed above, the date of independence is deemed 
as the critical date and the doctrine of uti possidetis applies as the 
intertemporal law that boundaries are deemed as consolidated at the 
time of independence. 
At this point, the Article will respond to some misunderstandings 
in intertemporal law, which confuse the rule of development of 
territorial right and the rule of intertemporal law. Indeed, when 
introducing intertemporal law, the two parts in the award of Island of 
Palmas are usually cited together:141 (1) “[a] juridical fact must be 
appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the 
law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to 
be settled;”142 and (2) “[a] distinction must be made between the 
creation of rights and the existence of rights.”143  However, the two 
parts are distinct, not “two branches of intertemporal law,”144 and the 
second rule is not an exception to the first one.145  The first part serves 
as the general rule of intertemporal law, not limited to territorial 
disputes.  The second rule refers to the primary law rules governing the 
development of territorial rights, which is subject to certain exceptions.  
As discussed above, the rule of effectivités for existing states is 
established through centuries of state practice.  Comparatively, the rule 
of uti possidetis makes an unclear distinction between so-called 
creation of rights and existence of rights.  This might be partly 
attributable to the legal fiction in the special context of decolonization, 
                                                          
140. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 840. 
141. See, e.g., JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
PERSPECTIVE 128–29 (2005); ELIAS, supra note 4, at 120; Higgins, supra note 32, at 
516; Paul Tavernier, Relevance of the Intertemporal Law, in THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 397 (J. Crawford, A. Pellet, & S. Olleson eds., 
2010). 
142. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. 
143. Id. 
144. See, e.g., Ulf Linderfalk, The Application of International Legal Norms 
over Time: the Second Branch of Intertemporal law, NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 
147–72 (2011). 
145. See, e.g., A. D’Amato, International Law, Intertemporal Problems, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1234–35 (R. Bernhardt ed., 1992). 
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or partly to the modern customary international law of emphasizing 
opinio juris rather than state practice––which endows customary 
international law with the capacity to form in a short or even rapid 
period.146  This is all for the underlying primary law rules and is 
logically separated from the rule of intertemporal law as the secondary 
law rule. 
b. Intertemporal law in territorial disputes 
The basic rule of intertemporal law in territorial disputes is quite 
clear: “a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law 
contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a 
dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.”147  The primary rule 
in territorial law has also been analyzed sufficiently, namely “a 
distinction must be made between the creation of rights and the 
existence of rights.”148  Thus, for existing states, territorial sovereignty 
is proved by effectivités.  Although international law acknowledges the 
notion of geographical or natural unity of particular areas, the 
presumption of title always rests on the sovereignty exercised in a 
certain territory.149  And, for newly created states, territorial 
sovereignty is often proved by uti possidetis. 
To elaborate further on the former, some situations arise far from 
the perfect model seen in Island of Palmas or Legal Status of Eastern 
Greenland, and the crystallization of the dispute cannot be found with 
                                                          
146. See Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757–91 (2001). Roberts 
argues: 
[T]raditional custom results from general and consistent practice followed 
by states from a sense of legal obligation. . . . By contrast, modern custom 
is derived by a deductive process that begins with general statements of 
rules rather than particular instances of practice. This approach 
emphasizes opinio juris rather than state practice because it relies 
primarily on statements rather than actions. 
Id. at 758; see also Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1988-89). 
147. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. 
148. Id. 
149. See Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, XXII R.I.A.A. ¶ 31; see also GERALD 
FITZMAURICE, LAW AND PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 46–
64 (1986). 
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certainty.150  Under those circumstances, efforts should be made to 
examine all relevant facts to see whether the sovereign effectivités has 
been established; particularly to determine who owns the better title.151  
In Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, for instance, the parties understood 
“title” as a clearly established right, which was “absolutely or relatively 
best right to a thing which may be in dispute,”152 other than a 
developing claim.  Both parties relied on evidence of possession, 
following Huber’s statement that “it is quite natural that the 
establishment of sovereignty may be the outcome of a slow evolution, 
of a progressive intensification of State control.”153  The tribunal 
elaborated that a historic title is a title “that has been created, or 
consolidated, by a process of prescription, or acquiescence, or by 
possession so long continued as to have become accepted by the law as 
a title.”154  The tribunal emphasized “there must be some absolute 
minimum requirement” for the acquisition of territorial sovereignty.155  
When making this emphasis, the tribunal found that historic title had 
never been solidified, because the chain of titles was interrupted and the 
situation changed over time.156 
While the critical date, as analyzed above, is usually used to settle 
the direct positive conflict of law concerning territorial disputes in 
respect of time––despite its status as an independent legal concept––the 
application of the theoretically simple rule of intertemporal law remains 
complicated.  First, the primary law rule variedly applies in how 
territorial title develops and changes over time.  Under this rule, the 
consolidated period of territorial title can only be determined on a case-
by-case basis, with no paradigm to follow.  Second, the crystallization 
                                                          
150. See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos, 1953 I.C.J. Rep. at 47; Eritrea/Yemen 
Arbitration, XXII R.I.A.A. at 211. 
151. This is the situation that is discussed above in the relationship between 
critical date and intertemporal law. In such cases, the underlying uncertainty of the 
evolution of the rights and disputes makes them not capable of triggering the 
discernment of critical date. The intertemporal law is to apply upon an analysis of 
totality. 
152. FREDERICK POLLACK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 177 (6th ed. 
1929). 
153. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 867. 
154. Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, XXII R.I.A.A. ¶ 106. 
155. Id. ¶ 118. 
156. Id. ¶ 125. 
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of disputes heavily depends on the parties’ behavior, with or without 
awareness of how international law affects such behaviors.  One who 
carefully compares European disputes157 with Arabian disputes,158 
would probably reach the same conclusion as that in Rann of Kutch.  
That case explains “the rights and duties which by law and custom are 
inherent in and characteristic of sovereignty present considerable 
variations in different circumstances according to time and place, and 
in the context of various political systems.”159 
In summary, given the uncertainties and unsolved controversies 
above, we can only conclude that intertemporal law’s basic rule or 
principle, namely “a juridical issue shall be decided in the light of the 
law contemporary with it (Rule 3),” applies in international territorial 
disputes.  With some exceptions, detailed instructions might serve as 
persuasive reference to explain: (1) for existing states, territorial 
sovereignty may be proved mainly by effectivités and the 
correspondingly contemporary law; and (2) for newly created states, 
territorial sovereignty is often proved by uti possidetis at the date of 
independence. 
2.  Indirect Conflict: Treaty Interpretation 
a. From initial intention to evolutionary interpretation 
Intertemporal law concerning territorial disputes heavily relies on 
the understanding of the acquisition and changes of territorial 
sovereignty.  Meanwhile, intertemporal law concerning treaty 
interpretation relies on the understanding of the evolution of law and 
the international legal system as a whole.  Those who believe that treaty 
interpretation and its element of time has nothing to do with 
intertemporal law, argue that application of law (intertemporal law) and 
interpretation of law should be differentiated.  Those who favor 
homogeneity challenge the consistency of intertemporal law because 
the evolutionary interpretation approach followed by case law after 
                                                          
157. E.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 53; 
Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 829. 
158. E.g., Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, 91 I.L.R. 543, 594 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1981). 
159. Rann of Kutch (India v. Pak.), 17 R.I.A.A. 1, 554 (1968). 
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1960160 contradicts intertemporal law’s general principle.  The general 
principal of intertemporal law is that “a juridical fact must be 
appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the 
law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to 
be settled.”161  For the latter, Eirik Bjorge argues for consistency by 
reminding people of the second significant finding in Island of 
Palmas.162 This second finding states, “[A] distinction must be made 
between the creation of rights and the existence of rights.”163  However, 
as discussed above, the second finding is about the underlying primary 
law rules instead of intertemporal law as the secondary law rule.  Hence, 
this argument is untenable. 
Nevertheless, there are two key issues.  First, whether, and to what 
extent, the totality of international law is considered in treaty 
interpretation.  Second, how much weight should be given to the 
involved parties’ intent once the treaty has entered into force and 
operates as part of the international legal system.  Although treaty law–
–as a living instrument that transcends over long periods of time––
customary international law, and perhaps international law as a whole 
has changed over time.  There is indirect conflict of law over time 
between previous and former customary international law, if they are to 
be considered to have any interaction with the treaty law at hand.  This 
sort of indirect conflict is more of a balance than a formula of a single 
choice.  While contemporaneity, namely the circumstances prevailing 
at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, must be considered,164 this 
does not prevent one from considering the rules of international law as 
they exist today.165 
                                                          
160. The argument first arose by the Commission in Rights of Nationals of 
United States of America in Morocco, supra note 5, and was later argued throughout 
the drafting process of the VCLT. 
161. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. 
162. See BJORGE, supra note 33; see also Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Eq. Guinea intervening), Judgment, 
2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303, 503 (Oct. 10) (separate opinion by El-Khasawneh, J.). 
163. Island of Palmas, II R.I.A.A. at 845. 
164. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 
Rep. at 346; Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border Between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, XXV R.I.A.A. 83 (Apr. 13, 2002); GREIG, supra note 32, at 366. 
165. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. at 77–80. 
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It is noteworthy that there has been an evident conversion in treaty 
interpretation with the element of time involved.  In cases before the 
1960s, international courts and tribunals tended to interpret treaties 
based on the initial intentions of parties at the time of conclusion of the 
treaties.166  However, one can easily find reason with careful 
examination that this does not exclude future development in 
evolutionary interpretation. 
For instance, before the PCA in 1910, in North Atlantic Coast 
Fisheries Arbitration, the U.K. and U.S. raised a number of disputes 
concerning the interpretation of Article 1 of the convention between 
them that entered into force in 1818.  The convention provided 
inhabitants of the U.S. with a series fishing rights, similar to those held 
by the British in a certain area of British coastline.167  The tribunal held 
that the principle of contemporaneity applied to treaty interpretation 
and, consequently, examined the parties’ intentions and the relevant 
circumstances that occurred at the treaty’s conclusion.168  Although the 
treaty had been in force for over a century, few changes had occurred 
in customary international law governing fishing rights.  The element 
of time did not play a vital role in the dispute, and no obvious indirect 
                                                          
166. See, e.g., Rights of Nationals of United States of America in Morocco, 
1952 I.C.J. Rep. at 193; Grisbadarna, XI R.I.A.A. at 155. 
167. See North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (U.K. v U.S.) XI R.I.A.A. 167 (1961). 
168. Id. at 196. 
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conflict of law was involved in this case.  Hence, the only conclusion is 
contemporaneity plays an important role in treaty interpretation and 
nothing more. 
Moreover, in Rights of Nationals of United States of America in 
Morocco in 1952, the ICJ stated treaties must be interpreted according 
to the parties’ initial intentions at the time of treaty’s conclusion.169  
However, the contested treaty was made in 1948, only four years 
earlier.170  Thus again, the element of time did not play a substantive 
role in determining the dispute.171 
Hence, the situation before the 1960s––that treaty interpretation 
was mainly based on the contemporaneity consideration and the initial 
intention of the parties––is largely due to the vacancy of time as an 
important element.  No evolution in relevant customary international 
law had occurred in those cases.  In other words, the treaties stood the 
test of time merely because time brought nothing to the relevant 
environment in which they stood.  International law remained a 
primitive status, where state practice and state intention played the 
decisive role and the pace of evolution of customary international law 
was rather slow. 
The turning point might be the advisory opinion in Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (“Namibia Advisory Opinion”) in 1971, where the ICJ 
determined the interpretation of the South West Africa Mandate of 
1920.172  However, the Court struggled to get to that point.  Before that 
advisory opinion, in 1966 the ICJ looked at the obligations of South 
Africa towards the U.N. in South West Africa in the South West Africa 
Cases.173  In answering whether apartheid violates the mandate, the 
Court made the following highly controversial statement: 
[T]he Court must place itself at the point in time when the mandates 
system was being instituted, and when the instruments of mandate 
                                                          
169. See Rights of Nationals of United States of America in Morocco, 1952 
I.C.J. Rep. at 193. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (S. W. Afr.), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16 (June 21). 
173. South West African Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), Second 
Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6 (July 18). 
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were being framed. The Court must have regard to the situation as it 
was at that time, which was the critical one, and to the intentions of 
those concerned as they appear to have existed, or are reasonably 
inferred, in the light of that situation.174 
The Court made two mistakes.  First, although the mandate was 
made in 1920, the dispute at hand was new and crystallized at some 
time after WWII, which is the true meaning of critical date.  Second, 
unlike the situation in North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration or 
Rights of Nationals of United States of America in Morocco, here, 
international law as a whole went through a major reform after WWII, 
in particular, the broad recognition of the right of self-determination in 
the tide of decolonization.175  Five years later, in an advisory opinion 
requested by the U.N. Security Council on “what are the legal 
consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa 
in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 
(1970),”176 the Court rejected the approach in the previous case, and 
made the following significant statement: 
Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument 
in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its 
conclusion, the Court is bound to take into account the fact that the 
concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant––”the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world” and “the well-being and 
development” of the peoples concerned––were not static, but were 
by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the 
“sacred trust.” The parties to the Covenant must consequently be 
deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the 
institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the 
changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and 
its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent 
development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and 
by way of customary law. Moreover, an international instrument has 
to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal 
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation. In the domain to 
which the present proceedings relate, the last fifty years, as indicated 
above, have brought important developments. These developments 
                                                          
174. Id. at 23. 
175. U.N. Charter art. 1(2). 
176. S.C. Res. 284, ¶ 1 (July 29, 1970). 
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leave little doubt that the ultimate objective of the sacred trust was 
the self-determination and independence of the peoples 
concerned.177 
The Namibia Advisory Opinion provides a classic example of 
evolutionary interpretation. Not only in the sense that it might be the 
first case to give a concrete elaboration on that point, but also because 
the Court attached significance to the universality of the international 
legal system as a whole.  That acknowledgement provided a logical 
precondition of the existence of such a system and the existence of 
certain interactions among legal instruments within the system.  This 
explains why direct and indirect conflict of law should be considered–
–for the uniformity and consistency of the international legal system as 
a whole. 
Indeed, the question of priority between customary international 
law and treaty law is rather complicated.178  Although there are general 
rules like lex posterior derogat priori, and lex specialis derogat legi 
generali,179 international law is not a natural science.  The application 
and interpretation of law is based more on the balance of the value of 
stability and evolution of law than on any strict formula.  After the 
Namibia Advisory Opinion, there was a trend in case law that went 
further in the approach of evolutionary interpretation.  In interpreting 
treaty law, international courts and tribunals tended to attach more 
significance to the evolution of relevant international law as a whole 
and, consequently, acted much more progressively in developing 
international law.180  Moreover, the intertemporal concern itself 
presented a major issue in the drafting of the VCLT, including the 
interpretation rule in Article 31.  The result was, instead of interpreting 
                                                          
177. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. at 53. 
178. MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 
(1985). 
179. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group on 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/L.682, ¶ 30 (Apr. 13, 2006); 
OPPENHEIM, supra note 27, at 1270, 1280. 
180. See, e.g., Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 2009 I.C.J. 
Rep. 213; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. at 3; Right of Passage over 
India Territory, 1960 I.C.J. Rep. at 6. 
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a treaty with the relevant international law that existed at the time of 
conclusion of the treaty, the VCLT Commission decided to officially 
embrace the evolutionary interpretation approach.181  Many scholars 
made the same conclusion from analyzing the VCLT’s legislative 
history.182 
Case law also shows consistency in evolutionary interpretation.  In 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ held the expression “disputes 
relating to the territorial status of Greece” in the treaty should be 
interpreted consistent with the rules of current international law to 
include the newly created regime, such as the continental shelf, and not 
with the rules that existed when the treaty was concluded in 1931.183  In 
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, the ICJ explicitly 
defined evolutionary interpretation as: 
Situations in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion of the treaty 
was, or may be presumed to have been, to give the terms used––or 
some of them––a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one 
                                                          
181. See VCLT, supra note 31, art. 31(3)(c). There is big change in the 
methodology of interpretation, from initial intention to evolutionary interpretation. 
This can be seen in the Yearbook of the International Law Commission: “In the light 
of the rules of general international law in force at the time of its conclusion.” Report 
of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
No. 9, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/5809 (1964), reprinted in [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
173, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964/Add.1, at 199. It also “failed to deal with the 
problem of the effect of an evolution of the law on the interpretation of legal terms in 
a treaty and was therefore inadequate.” Report of the International Law Commission 
to the General Assembly, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/5809 (1966), 
reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 169, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1, at 222. And: 
[I]n any event, the relevance of rules of international law for the 
interpretation of treaties in any given case was dependent on the intentions 
of the parties, and that to attempt to formulate a rule covering 
comprehensively the temporal element would present difficulties. It 
further considered that correct application of the temporal element would 
normally be indicated by interpretation of the term in good faith. 
Id. 
182. See, e.g., ELIAS, supra note 4; GREIG, supra note 32; Higgins, supra note 
32; Rosenne, supra note 32. 
183. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. at 77–80. 
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fixed once and for all, so as to make allowance for, among other 
things, developments in international law.184 
Additionally, in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay in 2010, the ICJ 
determined whether the obligation of an environmental impact 
assessment––a newly created customary international law––could be 
interpreted from the bilateral agreement that came into force in 1976.185  
Again, the Court followed the evolutionary approach to incorporate the 
newly created obligation as binding on the parties.186 
Therefore, there is an indirect conflict of law in treaty 
interpretation.  The conflict lies between what customary international 
law was at the time of the conclusion of treaties, and customary 
international law at the time of a dispute to which interpretation is 
required.  This situation is called an indirect conflict because it is not 
the rules governing a certain legal situation that conflict (direct 
conflict), but rather the sources of determining the exact meaning of the 
rules that conflict.  Accordingly, the basic rule of intertemporal law, 
namely “a juridical issue shall be decided in the light of the law 
contemporary with it (Rule 3)” applies here as well, which usually 
results in evolutionary interpretation.  Nevertheless, as indicated above, 
this sort of conflict is more of a balance than a formula of single choice.  
To an extent, it reflects one of the fundamental rationales of law: the 
antinomy of stability and evolution. 
                                                          
184. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. at 
242. 
185. See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14 (Apr. 20). The Court held: 
In this sense, the obligation to protect and preserve, under Article 41 (a) of 
the Statute, has to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in 
recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now 
be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake 
an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed 
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary 
context, in particular, on a shared resource. 
Id. ¶ 204. 
186. Id. 
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b. The rationale behind the antinomy of stability and evolution 
Domestic and international law are, by nature, related to the values 
of security, expectation, stability, and predictability.  Indeed, the nature 
of law is to prescribe future conduct187 and, accordingly, to avoid 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and arbitrariness of the consequence of 
certain conduct.  However, though it may sound self-contradictory, the 
consideration of stability is not the only value behind law.  Instead, 
stability’s opposite value, evolution, is also significant to the legal 
system; both in the sense that there will always be undiscovered or 
unregulated areas, and in the sense that law may either develop 
gradually over time or evolve rapidly in response to certain historic 
events.188  In a word, one of the rationales behind intertemporal law is 
the antinomy189 of stability and evolution of law. 
Such antinomy can be further explained through significant 
findings in evolutionary interpretation.  Where “situations in which the 
parties’ intent upon the conclusion of the treaty was, or may be 
presumed to have been . . . a meaning or content capable of evolving, 
not one fixed once and for all, so as to make allowance for, among other 
things, developments in international law.”190  As commonly 
understood, treaties are primarily created to allow parties to work 
through uncertain legal relations, subsequent conduct, and possible 
consequences and events.  However, the words “capable” and 
“allowance” precisely embrace both the pursuit of stability and the 
realization of the inevitable existence of the uncertainty in future 
developments, as well as the consequent possibility of evolution.  This 
is a necessary response to the inherent limits of law.  There is 
discordance between the limited recognition of the contemporary 
                                                          
187. Hans Kelsen, The Rule Against Ex Post Facto Law and the Prosecution of 
the Axis War Criminals, 2 JUDGE ADVOC. J. 3, 8 (1945). 
188. This is to be further discussed in the following “non-retroaction” part 
concerning the development of international criminal law in the thesis. 
189. Antinomy means the equally rational but contradictory results of applying 
two laws. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (John M. D. Meiklejohn 
trans., 2004); see also SADIQ J. AL-AZM, THE ORIGINS OF KANT’S ARGUMENT IN THE 
ANTINOMIES (1972); Michelle Grier, The Logic of Illusion and the Antinomies, in A 
COMPANION TO KANT 192–206 (Graham Bird ed., 2006). 
190. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. at 
242. 
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situation and the unlimited possibility of changes to a situation on the 
same issue through the passage of time.  The antinomy of stability and 
evolution must be considered together with other things for it is one of 
the rationales behind intertemporal law.191 
Antinomy is clearly reflected in international intertemporal law, 
especially in evolutionary interpretation.  It can also be found in 
domestic or regional systems, particularly in the findings of legal 
custom and judicial decisions.  For instance, the U.K. successfully 
abolished the marital defense of rape through case law, rather than 
through legislation.192  In C.R. v. U.K., before the European Court of 
Human Rights, for the first time a man was held to have attempted to 
rape his wife.193  This was not based on any legislation, but on changes 
in legal custom and societal attitudes, where the evolution had reached 
a level to trigger the reasonable foreseeability of such a development of 
law.194 
Many leading authors cast doubt on such judicial decisions.  
Dworkin, for example, indicated that judicial lawmaking is ex post facto 
law-making, which is unjust.195  However, Kelsen wrote the rule against 
retroaction applies only to legislation, not to custom or judicial 
decisions, and any rule of custom applies retroactively in its first 
case.196  Nevertheless, if such judicial decisions are to be understood in 
this way, then every vital step in the development of law will be deemed 
as unjust ex post facto law-making (i.e. the abolishment of slavery, 
racial discrimination).  However, one of the rationales behind 
intertemporal law, the antinomy of stability and evolution, helps explain 
how the law as a whole develops over time in a delicate balance 
between the expectation of stability and the necessity of certain 
evolution. It is indeed as Crawford said: 
International law [as] a system . . . deal[s] with international persons, 
events, and transactions existing in time . . . . If one is concerned to 
                                                          
191. This is to be discussed in the following “non-retroaction” part in the article. 
192. C.R. v U.K., Judgment, Case No. 48/1994/495/577, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 34, 38 
(Oct. 27, 1995). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. HART, supra note 41, at 276. 
196. Kelsen, supra note 187, at 9. Kelsen does not believe that the custom or 
judicial decision is discovery of preexisting law other than creation of new law. 
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resolve a problem arising at that time, one applies the international 
law of that time . . . . If one is concerned to resolve a problem arising 
after that time, one asks how it is that international law may have 
changed since then, and whether the change makes any difference.197 
Therefore a rule that can be concluded is: 
Rule 4: One of the rationales behind intertemporal law is the 
antinomy of stability and the evolution of law 
C.  Negative Conflict 
1.  Ratione Temporis 
The principle of non-retroaction of treaties constitutes one of the 
fundamental principles in international law, as reflected in Article 28 of 
the VCLT.198  Such principle not only applies to substantive issues, but 
also to procedural issues like jurisdiction.  The ILC indicated that 
“when a jurisdictional clause is attached to the substantive clauses of a 
treaty as a means of securing their due application, the non-retroaction 
principle may operate to limit ratione temporis the application of the 
jurisdictional clause.”199 
The principle of ratione temporis is rarely mentioned with 
intertemporal law.  Through the temporal application of intertemporal 
law, we can conclude that ratione temporis is indeed the temporal 
application of jurisdiction and, therefore, constitutes an essential part of 
intertemporal law.  Accordingly, the basic rule of intertemporal law also 
applies here.  When a dispute occurs after the establishment of the 
jurisdiction, the dispute would be admissible under the rule of ratione 
temporis. 
In Phosphates in Morocco, the PCIJ looked at Italian citizens’ 
rights to explore phosphates in Morocco, which was a protectorate of 
                                                          
197. CRAWFORD, supra note 3, at 69. 
198. VCLT, supra note 31, art. 28.  
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact 
which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date 
of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.  
Id. 
199. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 187, art. 24(2) (1966). 
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France at the time.200  In 1931, France accepted the PCIJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction, explicitly emphasizing the principle of ratione temporis 
and alleged only to accept the disputes arising after the declaration of 
such acceptance.201  The Court found that the main facts that constituted 
the real cause of the dispute occurred before 1931, especially 
Morocco’s rejection of the Italian citizen’s application for recognition.  
Consequently, the case was held as inadmissible due to the lack of 
ratione temporis.202 
In Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, there was a previous 
arbitral award between Belgium and Bulgaria.203  Bulgaria argued that 
the Court lacked ratione temporis because the dispute was formed 
before that arbitral settlement and was thus formed before the parties’ 
recognition of the PCIJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.204  However, the 
Court found that the dispute indeed arose after the arbitral award and 
the declaration of compulsory jurisdiction. The Court explained that: 
A situation or fact in regard to which a dispute is said to have arisen 
must be the real cause of the dispute. In the present case it is the 
subsequent acts with which the Belgian Government reproaches the 
Bulgarian authorities . . . which in itself has never been disputed—
which form the centre point of the argument . . . .205 
Hence, jurisdiction was confirmed.  In 1960, Right of Passage over 
India Territory also discussed the principle of ratione temporis, 
following the previous two cases’ approach.206 
In sum, ratione temporis indeed constitutes a vital part of 
international intertemporal law as the procedural negative conflict of 
law in respect of time, where the basic rule of intertemporal law applies. 
                                                          
200. See generally Phosphates in Morocco, 1933 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No.74. 
201. Id. at 22. 
202. Id. at 27–29. 
203. See Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, 1939 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) 
No. 77. 
204. Id. at 83. 
205. Id.  
206. See Right of Passage over India Territory, 1960 I.C.J. Rep. at 6. 
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2.  Non-retroaction 
a. General principle of non-retroaction 
Long before the discovery of international intertemporal law, the 
principle of non-retroaction of law was established on the domestic 
level.  The first case to highlight this principle might be the Timokrates 
and the Athenian Ambassadors case in Ancient Greece, or Eastern 
Roman Emperor Theodosius II’s statement, and the Justinian Code.207  
The principle received broad acceptance in Canon Law and was further 
incorporated into common law through the medium of Bracton and 
Coke.208  In 1869, Savigny established two rules concerning non-
retroaction of law: (1) “[n]o retroactive effect is to be attributed to new 
laws;”209 and (2) “[n]ew laws leave acquired rights unaffected.”210  He 
further concluded the principle “ha[d] been transferred into the chief 
modern code” already by the middle of nineteenth century.211  Indeed, 
as Blum indicated, “it is a rule generally recognized by civilized nations 
that in principle no retroactive application should be given to any legal 
norm.”212 
Hans Kelsen explained that such rule established by Roman 
jurisprudence, in the process of its spread and development, has been 
replaced by a doctrine of natural law.  In such case, the nature of law is 
prescribing future conduct, while from the perspective of the past it is 
neither logically nor morally possible.213  Kelsen clarified and 
elaborated by explaining the operation of natural law does not rely on 
permission for contrary conduct––as positive law does––but instead 
relies on reasons evident to human logic; and consequently, a rule 
                                                          
207. Savigny quoted the sentences in his book without providing any citation. 
“Leges et constitutiones futuris certum dare est formam negotiis, non ad facta 
preterita revocari, nisi nominatim et de preterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus 
negotiis cautum sit.” SAVIGNY, supra note 1, at 291. 
208. Smead, supra note 12, at 776. 
209. SAVIGNY, supra note 1, at 280. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 295. 
212. BLUM, supra note 10, at 194. 
213. See Kelsen, supra note 188, at 8. 
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prescribing past conduct is beyond such reason and becomes 
meaningless.214 
However, this understanding may be defective in two ways.  First, 
the non-retroaction of law doctrine, based on its natural law 
consideration, originates not only from the logic of human beings, but 
also from the sense of justice against the arbitrary restriction and even 
sanctions by the authority towards individuals.  This origination also 
explains why great masters of political philosophy have addressed this 
doctrine.  For example, Thomas Hobbes and John Rawls emphasized 
the non-retroactive nature of law (nova constitutio futuris formam 
imponere debet, non praeteritis) and its vital position in legal 
constructions, as well as in society.215 
Second, Kelsen’s view that “[t]he postulate not to enact retroactive 
laws cannot be derived from the nature of law in the sense of legal 
positivism”216 might be wrong since the non-retroaction of law is also 
significant to legal positivism.  Against Austin’s theory of law as the 
command of sovereignty backed by the threat of sanction, Hart 
describes the law as a union of primary law rules and secondary law 
rules, and the general efficacy comes from such union, especially from 
the rule of recognition.217  Thus, such union certainly requires stringent 
legal logic and internal consistency, in which the rule governing the 
temporal application of law plays an important part, as a rule of 
recognition does for authority and efficacy.  As analyzed at the very 
beginning of this Article, one of the aims of the Article is to respond to 
Hart’s comment that international law is not real law due to the lack of 
secondary rules.218  The rule of intertemporal law, here as the rule of 
non-retroaction of law, is both a requirement under natural law theory–
–in the name of justice against arbitrariness––and a requirement under 
positive law theory––for the sake of legal logic against internal 
uncertainty and inconsistency. 
Under modern international law, the VCLT explicitly established 
that a treaty does not have retroactive effect unless a different intention 
                                                          
214. Id. 
215. See FULLER, supra note 34; HOBBES, supra note 34; RAWLS, supra note 
34. 
216. Kelsen, supra note 187, at 8; see also KELSEN, supra note 16. 
217. See generally HART, supra note 41 (especially Chapter V). 
218. Id. at 214. 
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appears.219  Although the expression of the rule may sound flexible, and 
so far despite international criminal law treaties and international 
human rights law treaties, the clause of non-retroaction can hardly be 
found in the context of treaties.220  However, case law shows 
consistency on the general application of the principle of non-
retroaction of international law.  For instance, in 1935, when the 
Council of the League of Nations asked the PCIJ for an advisory 
opinion on whether a decree was consistent with the constitution of 
Danzig, the Court held the decree was inconsistent with the constitution 
due to its retroactive effect.  The effects showed that it was in virtue of 
a law to make it possible for the individual to know, beforehand, the 
consequence of his conduct.221  Thus, the principle of non-retroaction 
was confirmed by the PCIJ. 
b. Possible derogation? From international criminal law to 
international human rights law 
In the same year of the PCIJ’s Advisory Opinion for Danzig, a 
different story unfolded in Nazi Germany.  A retroactive penal law was 
made on June 28, 1935, establishing that: 
Any person who commits an act which the law declares to be 
punishable or which is deserving of penalty according to the 
fundamental conceptions of the penal law and sound popular feeling, 
shall be punished. If there is no penal law directly covering an act it 
shall be punished under that law which most closely fits, in regards 
to fundamental conception.222 
                                                          
219. VCLT, supra note 31, art. 28. 
220. For example, neither the UN Charter, ICJ Statute, nor the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) contains a clause of non-retroaction. 
The international criminal treaties and international human rights law treaties will be 
further discussed in the next section. 
221. Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution 
of the Free City, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (Seri. A/B) No. 65, at 57 (Dec. 4). 
222. Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafgesetzbuches [Law to Amend the Penal 
Code], June 28, 1935, RGBL at 839 (Ger.). 
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It might be hard to comprehend to what extent such kind of 
legislation contributed to the morally “upside-down system”223 of the 
Nazi regime and the subsequent atrocities in WWII, but the atrocities 
indeed ended with a historic debate on legal retroaction.  Although there 
was no explicit conclusion made on the core issue of legal retroaction, 
both the Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo Trials were justified in two ways.  
First, the principle of non-retroaction was not absolute, and there was 
space for derogation.  Second, all the international crimes were found 
in customary international law and, therefore, were not ex post facto 
law. 
Above all, the possible derogation from the principle of non-
retroaction was established. At the very beginning, the issue of legal 
retroaction was at the heart of the debate at the London Conference, 
although no consensus has ever been reached.  Later, the famous 
statement was made in United States v. Göring that “the maxim nullum 
crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general, a 
principle of justice.”224  Cassese and Gallant clarified in the French 
version of the Judgment that the word “justice” was absent,225 which 
may have led to a more derogatory effect.  Nevertheless, such a 
statement might represent the major view in the Nuremberg Trials.  
Later, the Tokyo Trials followed this view,226 particularly when Dutch 
                                                          
223. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 291–92 (1973) 
(Arendt described this kind of situation as an upside-down system where “law 
becomes crime and crime becomes law”). 
224. United States v. Göring (Judgment), 1 International Military Tribunal: 
Trial of the Major War Criminals 171, 219 (1946). 
225. Henri Felix Auguste Donnedieu de Vabres, Le procès de Nuremberg 
devant les principes modernes du droit pénal international, 70 (I) Recueil des cours 
477, 503 (1947); see also Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity: Comments on 
Some Problematical Aspects, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN QUEST OF 
EQUITY AND UNIVERSALITY: L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL, UN SYSTÈME EN 
QUÊTE D’ÉQUITÉ ET D’UNIVERSALITÉ: LIBER AMICORUM GEORGES ABI-SAAB 429, 
433–35 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Vera Gowlland-Debbas eds., 2001); 
KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2008). 
226. However, unlike Nuremberg Trial, the Tokyo Trial never reached an 
internal consensus on the issue of legality and ended up with one joint judgment with 
three dissenting opinions and two separate opinions. 
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Justice Röling agreed with the French version.227  Discussions in the 
Tokyo Trials took this idea a step further.  For example, Philippine 
Justice Jaranilla stated that nullum crimen sine lege did not apply to 
international law and that retroaction was permissible.228  Justice 
Röling indicated that the non-retroaction as “a principle of justice” was 
too natural of a law and that the cases here should be settled according 
to positive law, namely the crimes indicated in the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Charter).229 
It is worth noting that while the Statement in the Nuremberg Trials 
theoretically provided possible derogation from the principle of non-
retroaction, the judgment was actually made on the findings of 
customary international law with three special but highly controversial 
techniques. First, it was left ambiguous whether the Nuremberg Trials 
were based on the legislative Charter;230 the authority of the occupied 
power;231 or on international law that was merely described in the 
Charter, and could be decided by judges during the judicial process.232 
Second, each indictment attempted to establish a violation of both the 
Charter and substantive international law at the time of the crime.233  
Although it was debated whether waging a war of aggression was an 
                                                          
227. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Judgment, 44–45 (1948) (Röling, J., 
concurring), http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/462134/. 
228. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Judgment, 18–19 (1948) (Jaranilla, J., 
concurring), https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/2393ff/. 
229. Id. at 4–5. 
230. The Chapeau of Article 6 of the Charter of the IMT is quite vague: 
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Art. 1 hereof for 
the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis 
shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests 
of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of 
organizations, committed any of the following crimes . . . . 
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal––Annex to the Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 
6(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, EAS No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
231. Indeed, it could be found in Judgment that Nuremberg Tribunal itself, to 
some extent acknowledged its sovereign right of legislation as occupied powers. See 
United States v. Göring, supra note 224, at 173–74, 218. 
232. Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the 
International Conference on Military Trials, 378 (London 1945) (He argued strongly: 
“We must leave the law to the judges to decide.”). 
233. GALLANT, supra note 225, at 91. 
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international crime,234 there was major support for the war crime.235  
Lord Wright, as an advocate of the Charter, argued all the crimes in 
Nuremberg were crimes under international law at that time.236  Of 
course, there were strong opponents against the Charter, including Otto 
Pannenbecker for the defendant Wilhelm Frick,237 and Justice Pal, the 
Indian Justice in the Tokyo Trials.238  Third, customary international 
law tended to be justified in a softened way to keep close consistency 
with general international law.  Justice Bernard’s view that the crimes 
were based on natural law and that natural law was not a retroactive 
law,239 was not accepted broadly because of its hard challenge on the 
then normal understanding of international law.  Instead, Kelsen’s 
explanation of international crimes as punishment for non-criminal 
legal violations or severe moral wrongs to humankind as a whole, might 
be more persuasive.240 
Both the methodology and findings in the post-WWII trials 
received many critiques.  Today, after years of exploration and revision, 
the principle of non-retroaction has gradually become “not only a 
                                                          
234. See generally Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative 
to the International Conference on Military Trials, 378 (London 1945). 
235. See generally id. 
236. Lord Wright, War Crimes under International Law, 62 L.Q. REV. 40, 41 
(1946). 
237. Oral Argument of Pannenbecker, Nuremberg Trial Proceeding Volume 18, 
164, Yale L. Sch. Avalon Project, at 164 (July 15, 1946), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/07-15-46.asp. 
238. Justice Pal wrote a dissenting judgment over 1000 pages and 
comprehensively argued against the legitimacy, legality, substantive law and the 
procedure rules in Tokyo Trial, including his strong view against legal retroaction and 
the application of natural law as source of international law. See INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAT EAST: DISSENTIENT JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE PAL 
(1999). 
239. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Judgment, 10 (1948) (Bernard, J., 
dissenting), https://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/d46836/. He said “[t]here is no doubt 
in my mind that such a war is and always has been a crime in the eyes of reason and 
universal conscience, expressions of natural law upon which an international tribunal 
can and must base itself to judge the conduct of the accused tendered to it.” ROBERT 
CRYER & NEIL BOISTER, DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL: CHARTER, INDICTMENT, AND JUDGEMENTS 670 (1st ed. 2008). 
240. See Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a 
Precedent in International Law?, 1 INT’L L.Q. 153, 165-66 (1947) (However, Kelsen 
himself deemed such finding an exception to the rule against ex post facto law). 
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principle of justice, [but] . . . embodies an internationally recognized 
human right.”241  On December 10, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly 
unanimously adopted Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Article 11(2) stipulates, “No one shall be held guilty of 
any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not 
constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the 
time when it was committed . . . .”242  This principle was later 
unanimously incorporated into Article 15 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.243  It was also utilized in the Third244 and 
Fourth245 Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols I and II of 
1977,246 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.247  Moreover, 
on a regional level, the principle was emphasized as a vital human right 
and was incorporated in the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,248 the American 
Convention on Human Rights,249 the African Charter of Human and 
People’s Rights,250 and the Arab Charter on Human Rights.251 
                                                          
241. GALLANT, supra note 225, at 3. 
242. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
243. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] art. 15, Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
244. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 65, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
245. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War art. 65, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
246. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 
art. 75(4)(c), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non–
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 6(2)(c), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609. 
247. G.A. Res 44/49, Convention on the Rights of the Child, November, art. 
40(2)(a) (Nov. 20, 1980). 
248. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221. 
249. American Convention on Human Rights arts. 7–9, Nov. 22, 1969, 1114 
U.N.T.S. 123. 
250. African Charter of Human and People’s Right art. 7(2), June 27, 1981, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5. 
251. Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 15, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 INT’L 
HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005). 
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In summary, the principle of non-retroaction, as the rule of negative 
conflict of law in respect of time, has been universally acknowledged 
through treaties, customary international law, and case law.  However, 
as Savigny predicted, the doctrine of non-retroaction is not without 
exception.252  For the historic post-WWII Trials, Kelsen provided a 
plausible explanation.  Kelsen believed the non-retroaction principle 
could be put in competition with another principle of justice and should 
be restricted by another.  In the case of the post-WWII Trials, that 
competitor was the significance and necessity to “bring the war 
criminals to justice than to respect, in their trial, the rule against ex post 
facto law, which has merely a relative value . . . .”253 
The antinomy of stability and evolution can also be used to 
understand the relationship between the post-WWII findings and the 
principle of non-retroaction.  This approach may provide a method of 
understanding the findings in the post-WWII Trials as within the system 
of intertemporal law.  If we recall C.R. v. U.K., where the European 
Court of Human Rights determined a rule of law was based not on 
legislation, but on legal custom changes and societal attitudes, the 
evolution had reached a level triggering the reasonable foreseeability of 
such development of law.254  The same results can be found in the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials.  Although the decisions might be deemed 
as judicial criminalization of the non-criminal illegal actions or severely 
morally wrong actions, the decisions were made in the special context 
of WWII, during which the atrocities had been accumulated so much 
and the justice, reconciliation, and legal remedies were extremely 
desired by all human beings, all of which were far beyond the 
expectation of the preexisting legal system.  Under such circumstances, 
it was not stability that was to be expected, but the legal system’s 
capability to “make allowance for”255 evolution of law in response to 
exceptional historic events.256 
                                                          
252. See SAVIGNY, supra note 1. 
253. Kelsen, supra note 187, at 11. 
254. C.R. v U.K., Judgment, Case No. 48/1994/495/577, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 34, 38 
(Oct. 27, 1995). 
255. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. at 
242. 
256. It was this evolution that Savigny used to justify abolitionism. “The 
transition from one of these conditions into the other, in consequence of the very 
gradual operation of Christian morals and circumstances, has been effected so slowly 
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CONCLUSION 
Below is a summary of the rules that can be derived from the 
analysis in this Article.  The rules are listed in the order in which they 
were addressed. 
Rule 1: International intertemporal law is the temporal application 
of international law or the conflict of international law in respect of 
time.  From the perspective of a single international law, intertemporal 
law might be deemed as the temporal application of law.  From the 
perspective of the international legal system as a whole, it could be 
deemed as the conflict of laws in respect of time.  If one observes from 
a certain point of time in the history of international disputes, it might 
be described as the choice of law at that certain point or period of time.  
 Rule 1.1: International intertemporal law is a secondary law rule 
and the settlement of disputes depends on the primary law rules it is 
based on.  Therefore, international intertemporal law itself does not 
create rights or responsibilities among states, but instead provides a 
settlement of temporal conflicts of laws based on the rights and 
responsibilities created in different areas of primary law rules.  Such 
characteristics of intertemporal law explain why the approaches differ 
substantially, prima facie, among different kinds of dispute settlements. 
Rule 2: International intertemporal law and critical date are 
separate concepts.  Critical date is not an internal or subsidiary concept 
of intertemporal law.  Although usually intertwined, critical date does 
not logically affiliate with intertemporal law.  The two concepts share 
the same concerns of the development of rights and disputes on the 
dimension of time. They are separate and independent rules in the sense 
that the precondition of critical date is the presumable existence of a 
rather mature legal system where the evolution of rights and disputes 
precisely follows certain modes, for example, an inchoate situation to a 
consolidated situation.  However, intertemporal law mainly focuses on 
the application of law on the dimension of time.   
Rule 2.1: Only part of international intertemporal law issues can be 
settled by, but not necessarily, critical date.  The two may overlap when 
the changing modes of the underlying rights are capable of triggering 
the issue of critical date; otherwise, the issue of intertemporal law can 
                                                          
and imperceptibly, that we cannot fix with certainty the epoch of history at which the 
former state of things ceased.” SAVIGNY, supra note 1, at 371. 
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be solved even when the mode of evolution is uncertain or unknown.  
In other words, the settlement of an intertemporal law problem does not 
necessarily rely on the discernment of critical date.  Nor does a critical 
date issue only arise in the context of intertemporal law.  Usually, 
critical date is utilized when settling a direct positive conflict of law in 
respect of time, other than an indirect positive conflict (treaty 
interpretation) or negative conflict (non-retroaction and ratione 
temporis).   
Rule 2.2: Critical date is a secondary law rule based on the 
underlying development of rights or disputes.  There are three common 
ways that critical date is utilized: (1) critical date as the concept related 
to the consolidation/solidification of a certain right in order to exclude 
the subsequent efforts to change that right; (2) critical date as the 
concept related to the crystallization of certain disputes in international 
dispute settlement to exclude the subsequent facts; and (3) critical date 
as the concept coincided with the time of the change of law and, 
consequently, as the concept used interchangeably with intertemporal 
law. 
Rule 3: The basic rule of international intertemporal law is that a 
juridical issue shall be decided in light of the law contemporary with it.  
Intertemporal law not only refers to the existence of the legal issue of 
temporal application, but also to the rule on how to decide temporal 
application.  The system of intertemporal law can be divided into two 
major categories and four sub-categories.  The two major categories 
are: positive conflict and negative conflict of international law.  For 
positive conflicts, there are two sub-categories: (a) direct conflict of 
law, with territorial disputes as a classic example; and (b) indirect 
conflict of law, namely treaty interpretation.  For negative conflicts, 
there are also two sub-categories: (a) the non-retroaction, which is 
substantive; and (b) ratione temporis, which is procedural. 
Rule 4: One of the rationales behind intertemporal law is the 
antinomy of stability and evolution of law.  Domestic and international 
law are, by nature, related to the values of security, expectation, 
stability, and predictability.  Indeed, the nature of law is to prescribe 
future conduct and, accordingly, to avoid uncertainty, unpredictability, 
and arbitrariness of the consequence of certain conduct.  However, 
although it may sound self-contradictory, the consideration of stability 
is not the only value behind law.  Instead, stability’s opposite value, 
evolution, is also significant to the legal system; both in the sense that 
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there will always be undiscovered or unregulated areas, and in the sense 
that law may either develop gradually over time or evolve rapidly in 
response to certain historic events.  This is a necessary response to the 
inherent limits of law.  There is discordance between the limited 
recognition of the contemporary situation and the unlimited possibility 
of an evolution of the same issue with the passage of time.  The 
antinomy of stability and evolution must be considered together with 
other factors for it is one of the rationales behind intertemporal law. 
 
57
Li: International Intertemporal Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2018
